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MAKING HORSES DRINK:  CONCEPTUAL 
CHANGE THEORY AND FEDERAL 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 502 
Liesa L. Richter* 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502 was designed five years ago in response to 
an outcry from lawyers, clients, and Congress about the escalating costs of 
electronic discovery.  The vast majority of these rising costs stems from 
page-by-page attorney review of electronically stored information (ESI) for 
privilege and work-product protection.  This culture of painstaking eyes-on 
privilege review is the offspring of traditional common law privilege and 
waiver doctrine, which has the potential to punish any breach in 
confidentiality with broad subject matter waiver extending well beyond the 
original mistaken disclosure and inflicting irreparable damage on the 
privilege holder’s litigation position.  The specter of such damaging 
privilege waivers has led to the tradition of expensive page-by-page pre-
production review.  In direct response to pleas for a change to common law 
waiver doctrine to protect clients from such broad exposure and to allow 
them to capitalize on the nature of ESI by facilitating technology-assisted 
review, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence 
undertook construction of a waiver rule for the twenty-first century.1  The 
result was Federal Rule of Evidence 502.2 
Having valiantly responded to the call for change, rulemakers anticipated 
rapid adoption and robust use of the new waiver rule to minimize 
expenditures associated with privilege review of ESI.3  Instead, Federal 
Rule of Evidence 502 has been met with suspicion and resistance from the 
very stakeholders that urged its adoption.4  Litigants continue to embrace 
 
*  Thomas P. Hester Presidential Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law.  I 
would like to extend a special thanks to Dan Capra for allowing me to be part of such a 
fascinating dialogue.  I would also like to thank my colleague Steve Gensler for his helpful 
insights into the Civil Rules. 
 1. See Panel Discussion, Reinvigorating Rule 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1533, 1535 
(2013) (comments of the Honorable Sidney Fitzwater) (explaining that Rule 502 was 
designed to address specific complaints regarding privilege review of ESI). 
 2. FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 3. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1544 (comments of the Honorable Paul 
Grimm) (noting that “there was so much hope and expectation for what this rule would do”). 
 4. Id. at 1535 (comments of the Honorable Sidney Fitzwater) (“Rather than enjoying 
rather robust usage, as had been anticipated, procedures and court orders permitted under 
Rule 502 are implemented relatively infrequently.”); see also Edwin M. Buffmire, The 
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traditional and costly eyes-on methodology in reviewing for privilege, 
notwithstanding the opportunities provided by Rule 502 to utilize more 
efficient and economical computer-assisted techniques.  This Symposium 
was designed to explore the reasons for underuse of Rule 502, as well as to 
identify possible rulemaking and educational measures that may allow the 
Rule to live up to its full potential.5 
Back in 2007, prescient commentators identified three key challenges in 
adapting litigation to the ESI era.6  First, new techniques needed to be 
developed for the retrieval and review of ESI.7  Second, rules of privilege 
needed to adapt to eliminate the dire consequences of inadvertent 
disclosure.8  Third and finally, litigators needed to “embrace creative, 
technological approaches to grappling with knowledge management,” 
equating to “perhaps the biggest new skill set ever thrust upon the 
profession” and a “revolution for the practice.”9  The first two challenges 
have largely been met with sophisticated retrieval and review 
methodologies and meaningful waiver protection in the form of Rule 502.  
It appears that the third challenge presents a more formidable obstacle.  
Lawyers steeped in the adversarial tradition and common law privilege 
doctrine have yet to embrace fully the technology-assisted privilege review 
that stands ready to preserve significant litigation resources. 
In examining reasons for this phenomenon and the current 
underutilization of Rule 502, “conceptual change theory” provides a useful 
framework for identifying impediments to fuller implementation of the 
Rule, as well as potential remedies.  This theory, described by Cornell 
researchers in the 1980s, highlights the process “by which people’s central, 
organizing concepts change from one set of concepts to another set, 
incompatible with the first.”10  Conceptual change theory posits that 
dramatic conceptual change from longstanding and tenaciously followed 
practices to inconsistent methodology can only be realized if there is 
(1) data-supported dissatisfaction with the status quo and (2) data-supported 
viable alternatives to the status quo.11 
A shift from eyes-on privilege review methodology to computer-assisted 
review that allows documents to be produced to an adversary without 
lawyer review represents the very type of radical change unlikely to 
 
(Unappreciated) Multidimensional Benefits of Rule 502(d):  Why and How Litigants Should 
Better Utilize the New Federal Rule of Evidence, 79 TENN. L. REV. 141, 141 (2011) (noting 
that litigants “have been slow to adopt” 502 and the Rule “has not lived up to its promise”). 
 5. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1539 (comments of Professor Daniel J. Capra, 
Moderator) (noting that the Symposium was designed to provide perspective about what can 
be done to “energiz[e]” Rule 502). 
 6. George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation:  Can the Legal System 
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, at 2–3 (2007). 
 7. Id. at 3. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. George J. Posner et al., Accommodation of a Scientific Conception:  Toward a 
Theory of Conceptual Change, 66 SCI. EDUC. 211, 211 (1982). 
 11. Id. at 213. 
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transpire absent satisfaction of both steps in the conceptual change 
process.12  Exploring Rule 502 in tandem with litigant incentives reveals 
several potential impediments to conceptual change at each phase of the 
process.  For several reasons, there may be inadequate dissatisfaction with 
the traditional eyes-on privilege review methodology to drive meaningful 
change.  Further, litigants may not recognize technology-assisted 
approaches to privilege review and “quick-peek” arrangements with 
litigation adversaries as viable alternatives to the traditional model that 
emphasizes confidentiality at all costs. 
Part I of this Essay will briefly discuss the “default” provisions found in 
Rule 502(a) and (b) and the contributions that those subsections of the Rule 
have made to reforming costly privilege review.  Part I will suggest that 
these portions of the Rule have largely achieved their purpose and need not 
be amended to bolster the effectiveness of Rule 502.  Part II will focus on 
the “self-help” provisions found in Rule 502(d) and (e).  Increasing litigant 
reliance on these provisions presents the best opportunity for Rule 502 to 
achieve its initial goal of reducing prohibitive costs associated with e-
discovery.  Part II will highlight several impediments to party reliance on 
these “self-help” provisions through the lens of conceptual change theory.  
Finally, Part II suggests potential educational and rulemaking measures to 
remove these impediments to adoption and to increase party reliance on 
these cost-saving measures. 
I.  A SIGNIFICANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION:  
THE “DEFAULT” PROVISIONS OF RULE 502 
In taking stock of Rule 502, it is important to emphasize that subsections 
(a) and (b) of the Rule have already made significant contributions to more 
cost-effective privilege review of ESI.  Rule 502(a) successfully curtails 
concerns about subject matter waiver that may fuel wasteful expenditures 
on privilege review and create leverage to settle otherwise defensible 
lawsuits.13  Fear of subject matter waiver was repeatedly cited as a driving 
force behind costly page-by-page privilege review during the public 
hearings on Rule 502.14  Rule 502(a) eliminates the specter of broad and 
damaging subject matter waivers arising out of inadvertent disclosures by 
limiting subject matter waiver to instances of intentional selective 
disclosure of privileged or protected information that creates unfairness to 
the adversary.15 
 
 12. Id. at 212 (describing the radical form of conceptual change requiring replacement of 
central commitments with incompatible principles as an “accommodation”). 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 502(a). 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (identifying a purpose of the rule as 
dealing with longstanding disputes over subject matter waiver).  Such concerns also 
animated the discussion of e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND COMMENTARY, 
531–32 (2012 ed.). 
 15. FED. R. EVID. 502(a); see also GENSLER, supra note 14, at 531 (noting lawyer 
complaints regarding broad subject matter waiver and describing the Rule 502(a) remedy). 
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Rule 502(b) protects against inadvertent waivers associated with 
mistaken disclosures by providing protection for parties that utilize 
reasonable pre-production measures to prevent such accidental disclosures 
and reasonable and prompt post-production measures to assert and preserve 
privilege.16  The commentary to Rule 502(b) encourages judicial 
recognition of technology-assisted review methodologies as reasonable.17  
Therefore, Rule 502(b) has successfully brought a uniform standard to the 
issue of inadvertent disclosure by clearly adopting a reasonableness 
approach and clearly signaling in the Rule and commentary the demise of 
the strict waiver or merciful “accidents won’t be punished” approaches.  
Both Rule 502(a) and (b) extend protection against waiver to federal and 
state proceedings, ensuring that a federal disclosure protected under the 
Rule will remain protected in other federal or state proceedings.18  Rule 
502(a) and (b) need not be affirmatively utilized by litigants to serve their 
palliative purposes because they are default provisions that apply regardless 
of any specialized use by the parties.19  Accordingly, there is no need to 
encourage adoption or utilization of these provisions of the Rule.20 
Notwithstanding the significant advances embodied in these provisions, 
inconsistent judicial interpretation has undermined somewhat the 
predictable protection Rule 502 was designed to create.21  Interpretive 
difficulties have included questions over the meaning of “inadvertent” 
production in 502(b).  A few courts have suggested that a voluntary 
production of a privileged document, even unwittingly, is not “inadvertent,” 
thus reinserting the possibility of subject matter waiver for accidental 
disclosures.  Other courts have interpreted the term “inadvertent,” as 
intended by the drafters of Rule 502, to coincide with the traditional 
definition of “inadvertent” as meaning “mistaken” or “accidental.”22 
Much more prevalent are differences in the interpretation of 
“reasonableness” for purposes of Rule 502(b).  Courts analyzing Rule 
502(b) vary with respect to the level of pre-production effort necessary to 
prevent a waiver, thus perpetuating some uncertainty for parties who 
inadvertently disclose privileged information.  Some courts appear to 
maintain the wide-open forgiving standard that predated Rule 502 by 
 
 16. FED. R. EVID. 502(b). 
 17. Id. advisory committee’s note (“[A] party that uses advanced analytical software 
applications and linguistic tools in screening for privilege and work product may be found to 
have taken ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent inadvertent disclosure.”). 
 18. See FED. R. EVID. 502(a)–(b). 
 19. Of course, to serve their ultimate purpose of reducing the costs of privilege review, 
parties must be aware of the existence and operation of Rule 502(a) and (b) in order to 
design privilege review against the backdrop of protection they provide.  Still, litigants need 
not take affirmative steps in the course of discovery to trigger these protections. 
 20. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1539 (comments of Professor Daniel J. Capra, 
Moderator) (noting that Rule 502(d) is the “foremost focus” of the Symposium). 
 21. See Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Matthew P. Kraeuter, Federal Rule 
of Evidence 502:  Has it Lived Up to Its Potential?, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, at 63–78 (2011) 
(detailing interpretive pitfalls in federal cases). 
 22. Id. at 29–33. 
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focusing on the “interests of justice” instead of pre-production 
precautions.23  Others appear to maintain a strict view, insisting on “all” 
reasonable means to prevent disclosure.24  Still others appear to embrace 
the middle ground approach embodied in Rule 502(b), but disagree as to 
which steps are “reasonable” to prevent and rectify inadvertent disclosures.  
Interpretive difficulties surround issues of reliance on outside document 
review vendors, use of key word searches to locate potentially privileged 
information, the size of a production, the deadline for a production, and 
document retention policies.25 
While educational measures could advance more uniform interpretation, 
rulemaking action appears unnecessary with respect to Rule 502(a) and (b) 
for three primary reasons.  First, the commentary explaining the intent 
behind these provisions is clear and instructive.  Courts and litigants 
consulting the legislative history of the rule should ultimately arrive at the 
proper reasonableness calibration using the existing standard.  Furthermore, 
as judges become increasingly tech-savvy, attitudinal opposition to 
computer-assisted review may diminish.  Second, a “reasonableness” 
approach is inherently variable and impossible to nail down with certainty 
in rule text.  In other words, the standard chosen as the optimal one 
necessarily invites some interpretive flexibility that cannot be cured without 
adopting a more bright-line standard.  Third, and most importantly, Rule 
502(a) and (b) represent the default waiver rules that apply to discovery 
disclosures when parties have not planned in advance for waiver issues 
during production of ESI.  The “self-help” provisions found in subsections 
(d) and (e) of Rule 502 are tailor-made to eliminate unpredictable 
interpretive pitfalls. 
Rule 502(d) and (e) have the potential to give litigants the control and 
certainty they require by allowing them to request an order preventing 
waiver of privilege as a result of disclosures to an adversary, irrespective of 
the care taken in pre-production review.26  Such federal court orders are 
binding in all other federal and state proceedings.27  Therefore, remaining 
uncertainty in the default provisions can be avoided by affirmative litigant 
use of Rule 502(d) and (e).   Because these “self-help” provisions present 
the best opportunity for litigants to create the predictability necessary to 
 
 23. Id. at 44 (discussing Rhoads Industries, Inc. v. Building Materials Corp. of America, 
254 F.R.D. 216 (E.D. Pa. 2008), and the use of the “interests of justice” standard to interpret 
502(b)). 
 24. Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 41–42 (noting that courts such as the one in Mt. 
Hawley Insurance Co. v. Feldman Production, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 125 (S.D. W. Va. 2010), “set 
the bar quite high for what . . . a party must do to avoid a finding of unreasonableness”). 
 25. See Ann M. Murphy, Federal Rule of Evidence 502:  The “Get Out Of Jail Free” 
Provision—or Is It?, 41 N.M. L. REV. 193, 228–32 (2011) (comparing judicial approaches to 
Rule 502(b) analysis). 
 26. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) & advisory committee’s note (the “court order may provide for 
return of documents without waiver irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing party.”); 
FED. R. EVID. 502(e) & advisory committee’s note. 
 27. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (the “terms [of a 502(d) order] are 
enforceable against non-parties in any federal or state proceeding.”). 
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reduce e-discovery costs, educational and rulemaking efforts should be 
directed toward resolving any obstacles to robust party use of these portions 
of Rule 502. 
II.  THE “SELF-HELP” PROVISIONS OF RULE 502:  
WHAT ARE THEY GOOD FOR? 
Pursuant to Rule 502(e), litigants may enter “[a]n agreement on the effect 
of disclosure [of privileged information] in a federal proceeding.”28  This 
provision in the Evidence Rules complements Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(f), which directs litigants to develop a discovery plan and to 
state the parties’ views and proposals on “any issues about claims of 
privilege or of protection as trial-preparation materials, including—if the 
parties agree on a procedure to assert these claims after production.”29 
Using these provisions, litigation adversaries may agree to allow one 
another to “claw back” inadvertently produced privileged or protected 
documents, regardless of the care taken in pre-production review.  Parties 
may even elect to use a “quick-peek” arrangement whereby they agree to 
produce documents with no pre-production review and to review for 
privilege and work-product protection only after designation of documents 
for use by the opposing side.30  Pursuant to such agreements, disclosure of 
privileged or protected documents does not waive privilege or work product 
protection as between the parties.31 
While such agreements are helpful in binding the parties that are 
signatories, they cannot offer protection against arguments of waiver made 
by nonparties.32  For this reason, Rule 502(d) allows the parties to seek 
entry of a federal court order providing that disclosures made in connection 
with the litigation pending before the court will not result in any waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, irrespective of the 
care taken in pre-production review.33  Entry of such an order protects the 
parties from a finding of waiver “in any other federal or state proceeding.”34  
Therefore, it is the entry of a court order pursuant to Rule 502(d) that has 
the power to provide the certain, predictable, and thorough protection to 
litigants wishing to reduce the costs of e-discovery by eliminating privilege 
review altogether or performing it through technology-assisted searches. 
Although both the Evidence Rules and the Civil Procedure Rules clearly 
contemplate party cooperation to address waiver issues, the commentary to 
Rule 502 expressly provides that “[p]arty agreement should not be a 
 
 28. FED. R. EVID. 502(e). 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(D). 
 30. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) advisory committee’s note (“[T]he rule contemplates 
enforcement of ‘claw-back’ and ‘quickpeek’ arrangements as a way to avoid the excessive 
costs of pre-production review for privilege and work product.”); see also GENSLER, supra 
note 14, at 558 (discussing “quick-peek” and “clawback” nonwaiver protocols). 
 31. FED. R. EVID. 502(e). 
 32. Id. (providing that agreement “is binding only on the parties to the agreement”). 
 33. FED. R. EVID. 502(d). 
 34. Id. 
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condition of enforceability of a federal court’s order.”35  Therefore, a court 
may enter a Rule 502(d) order where the parties agree, at the request of one 
party and over the objection of the other, or sua sponte absent party 
request.36  Regardless of the method chosen, some stakeholder in the 
federal litigation—either one of the parties or the trial judge—must 
recognize the benefits of a 502(d) order and act affirmatively to construct 
one.  Notwithstanding that Rule 502 was enacted in 2008, courts and 
litigants do not appear to be taking advantage of these “self-help” 
provisions to the extent anticipated.37  In order to help Rule 502 achieve its 
full potential, it is useful to explore why the provisions have not caught on 
in order to identify rulemaking and educational measures that may increase 
use of Rule 502(d) and (e).38 
A.  Lessons from Conceptual Change Theory 
In analyzing reasons for the slow adoption of Rule 502’s “self-help” 
provisions, “conceptual change theory” may be a useful construct to frame 
and identify the problem.39  This theory, described by Cornell researchers in 
the 1980s, highlights the process “by which people’s central, organizing 
concepts change from one set of concepts to another set, incompatible with 
the first.”40  Conceptual change theory delineates the steps by which the 
“central commitments” that “define problems, indicate strategies for dealing 
with them, and specify criteria for what counts as solutions” undergo 
 
 35. Id. advisory committee’s note (“Party agreement should not be a condition of 
enforceability of a federal court’s order.”). 
 36. Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 59–60 (citing the Statement of Congressional Intent 
accompanying Rule 502, 154 CONG. REC. 18,017 (2008), noting that a court may enter a 
502(d) order on motion of one or more of the parties or “on its own motion”). 
 37. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 38. Scholars have suggested that merely persuading litigants to incorporate Rule 502(d) 
orders into their discovery plans as a matter of course would represent a significant step 
forward. See Buffmire, supra note 4, at 145 (urging pro forma adoption of 502(d) orders); 
see also Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1554 (comments of Chilton Varner, Esq.) (“[W]e 
negotiate 502(d) orders in every case. We do it as a best practice, because regardless of 
whether we review or don’t review, the chances are that something is going to slip through 
the filter.”).  There can be little question that all rational parties should incorporate a 502(d) 
order into their discovery plan given that 502(d) provides greater insurance against waiver 
than the default standard embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b).  Thus, litigants can 
benefit from a 502(d) order even if they wish to maintain traditional attorney review for 
privilege.  To achieve the intended benefit of Rule 502, however, and to reduce wasteful 
privilege review costs, parties must use the self-help provisions to cut privilege review costs 
and not merely as additional protection in the context of traditional privilege review 
methodology.  There is merit to the concept of increasing use of 502(d) orders in the context 
of traditional privilege review as a preliminary step toward eventual cutting of discovery 
costs, however.  If litigants become accustomed to incorporating 502(d) orders into their 
discovery plans, they may slowly start to cut some privilege review corners after some 
successful clawback experiences, ultimately advancing the goals of Rule 502.  That said, 
exploring impediments to the paradigm shift in privilege review methodology is crucial to 
achieving the full benefit of Rule 502. 
 39. See Posner et al., supra note 10, at 211. 
 40. Id. 
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modification.41  The most radical form of conceptual change, known as an 
“accommodation,” requires one to “replace or reorganize” central 
commitments.42  This form of conceptual change occurs when:  
(1) “[c]entral concepts . . . have generated a class of problems which they 
appear to lack the capacity to solve” and (2) when a “competing view . . . 
appears to have the potential to solve these problems.”43  In other words, 
dramatic conceptual change from long-standing and tenaciously followed 
practices to inconsistent methodology can only be realized if there is:  
(1) data-supported dissatisfaction with the status quo and (2) a data-
supported viable alternative.44 
The Rule 502 revolution, which encourages litigants to replace page-by-
page privilege review with electronic, limited, or no privilege review prior 
to production, constitutes the type of radical conceptual shift unlikely to 
occur without data-driven dissatisfaction with traditional review and a data-
supported viable alternative.  Page-by-page privilege review started with 
contemporary discovery and derives from longstanding common law rules 
of privilege that demand maintenance of confidentiality to preserve 
privilege.45  Without question, this is a time-honored and tenaciously 
followed method of protecting privilege.46  Further, the scarring results of 
the subject matter waiver and strict inadvertent waiver common law 
standards helped to establish the stable privilege review methodology 
practiced in the federal system for decades.47  Prior to enactment of Rule 
502, an attorney who inadvertently disclosed a single privileged document 
might suffer a waiver with respect to all other privileged documents within 
the vaguely defined same “subject matter.”48  Even absent subject matter 
waiver, an attorney who disclosed a privileged document inadvertently 
could waive privilege with respect to the disclosed document itself, 
potentially damaging the client’s litigation position in pending or future 
 
 41. Id. at 212. 
 42. This form of conceptual change is termed an “accommodation.” Id. 
 43. Id. at 213. 
 44. Id. at 212 (noting that learning “is best viewed as a process of conceptual change” 
that is driven by the “available evidence”). 
 45. See Paul & Baron, supra note 6, at 17 (explaining that the modern free exchange of 
discovery began in 1938 as a reaction to the former system in which “an attorney relied 
primarily on her opponent’s pleading for discovery”). 
 46. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.28, at 379 
(5th ed. 2012) (noting the common law rule that the “attorney-client privilege is waived by 
the client’s voluntary disclosure of any significant part of the privileged communication or 
matter in a nonprivileged setting”). 
 47. See Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in 
the Federal Courts:  A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211, 
213 (2006) (“Many courts . . . hold that when waiver is found . . . it covers not only the 
document itself but also any communication dealing with the same subject matter.  Thus, 
counsel must carefully review all documents to assess the possible application of privilege or 
work product protection.” (footnote omitted)). 
 48. Id. at 214 (noting that waiver could “extend to all communications on the same 
subject matter”). 
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cases.49  Traditional privilege review practices rely upon page-by-page 
review of all produced documents to prevent such inadvertent disclosures 
and corresponding waivers.50  Thus, page-by-page privilege review appears 
to be the very type of ingrained practice that constitutes part of lawyers’ 
“theoretical hard core.”51 
In contrast, Rule 502 encourages litigants to take advantage of the ESI 
revolution and to utilize “advanced analytical software applications and 
linguistic tools in screening for privilege and work product.”52  One 
computerized review methodology that has been proposed to significantly 
reduce discovery costs is “predictive coding.”53  This methodology is “a 
type of computer-categorized review . . . that classifies documents 
according to how well they match the concepts and terms in sample 
documents.”54  It requires that attorneys review only samples of ESI for 
privilege, as well as responsiveness and relevance.  With input from the 
attorneys with respect to this sample, the computer can score a large volume 
of ESI as to relevance, responsiveness, and privilege.  Lawyers again 
review small sets of scored data to assess the accuracy of the scores, thus 
refining the search and teaching the computer to score more accurately.55  
While this method involves eyes-on review of small samples of ESI, it 
significantly decreases lawyer time by relying upon computer learning and 
computer-generated decisions about privilege.  Rule 502(d) was designed to 
allow reliance on methods like predictive coding to achieve savings with 
confidence that computer error, should it occur, will not waive privilege.  
Further, Rule 502(d) was intended to permit parties to forego pre-
production privilege review altogether in appropriate cases through “quick-
peek” arrangements whereby review for privilege is postponed until after 
production to an adversary.56   Adoption of quick-peek arrangements or 
predictive coding techniques requires a true paradigm shift from one of 
preserving confidentiality at all costs to one that accepts the potential 
sharing of privileged information with the adversary.   Such a seismic shift 
in privilege theory appears unlikely to be embraced absent data-driven 
dissatisfaction with traditional eyes-on privilege review and a data-
supported viable alternative upon which litigants can depend.  As discussed 
below, both of these steps necessary for conceptual change may present 
obstacles to the swift abandonment of traditional privilege-review practice. 
 
 49. Id. at 213 (inadvertent or unintentional disclosure results in waiver). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Posner et al., supra note 10, at 212 (describing the central commitments that define 
problems and identify strategies for dealing with them as part of the “theoretical hard core”). 
 52. FED. R. EVID. 502(b) advisory committee’s note. 
 53. NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, WHERE THE 
MONEY GOES:  UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY, at xvii (2012) (describing predictive coding as a method that would “achieve 
substantial savings in producing massive amounts of electronic information” by letting 
“computers do the heavy lifting for review”). 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Lawyers As the 502 Gatekeepers:  Satisfaction with 
the Privilege Review Status Quo 
The first step to conceptual change involves dissatisfaction with the 
status quo.  Before a radical conceptual change can occur, the prevailing 
theory must generate dissatisfaction due to its inability to solve a class of 
problems it was designed to address.57  When it comes to using Rule 502(d) 
to abandon traditional privilege review, the question becomes whether the 
traditional central commitment to eyes-on privilege review has generated a 
class of problems that it cannot solve. 
Ample data has been collected regarding the prohibitive costs of eyes-on 
privilege review of massive amounts of ESI preserved for litigation that 
may be discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.58  A 
presentation by Verizon at the 2007 public hearings on Rule 502 revealed a 
shocking $13.5 million in outside privilege review expenditures for a single 
piece of litigation.59  Recent studies suggest that at least 70 percent of ESI 
discovery costs are generated by the pre-production review process.60  This 
data and other examples explored by the Advisory Committee and well-
documented in federal cases demonstrate that the advent of ESI discovery 
has generated prohibitive costs that cannot be controlled using traditional 
privilege review methodology, at least in some cases.61  This data 
notwithstanding, there may be inadequate attorney dissatisfaction with 
traditional privilege review to drive conceptual change for several reasons. 
First, it may be that the type of case in which the traditional model truly 
no longer functions remains relatively rare in an individual attorney’s 
practice.  There may be a sizeable number of cases where there is limited 
ESI discovery.  Even in cases involving extensive discovery of ESI, 
significant pre-production review expenditures may be eclipsed by the 
 
 57. Posner et al., supra note 10, at 213 (“Central concepts are likely to be rejected when 
they have generated a class of problems which they appear to lack the capacity to solve.”). 
 58. FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (“It responds to the widespread 
complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect against waiver of attorney-client privilege 
or work product have become prohibitive.”); PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at xiii (“[I]n 
recent years, claims have been made that the societal shift from paper documents to [ESI] 
has led to sharper increases in discovery costs than in the overall cost of litigation.”); Broun 
& Capra, supra note 47, at 213 (noting that litigation involving voluminous documents is a 
“harrowing and enormously expensive business”). 
 59. See Hearing of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 86–88 (Jan. 29 2007) 
[hereinafter New York Hearing], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rulesand
Policies/rules/2007-01-29-Evidence-Minutes-Transcript.pdf (testimony of Patrick Oot, 
Director of Electronic Discovery & Senior Counsel, Verizon).  Total review costs for the 
litigation exceeded $11 million. Id. 
 60. PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at xiv (noting that “the major cost component in 
our cases was the review of documents for relevance, responsiveness, and privilege 
(typically about 73 percent)”). 
 61. Id. at xx (computer-review is “the only reasonable way to handle large-scale 
production”). 
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amount at stake for the producing party.62  Although the high absolute 
dollar amount expended in pre-production privilege review in the federal 
courts may represent a systemic failure, there may be inadequate 
dissatisfaction with traditional privilege review methodology among 
individual litigants to drive systemic change through the individual 
decision-making necessary to utilize Rule 502.  Where lawyers can depend 
upon page-by-page review in many cases, they may be unwilling to explore 
alternatives in the fraction of cases where computer-assisted review would 
be warranted. 
Second, even in cases involving significant and costly ESI production, 
other available mechanisms may operate to preserve the perceived viability 
of traditional privilege review.  The e-discovery amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure limit discovery of ESI that is “not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”63  These amendments narrow 
the field of ESI requiring privilege review.  In addition, the Civil Procedure 
Rules require judges to limit the extent of discovery when “the burden or 
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering 
the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues.”64  Further, judges have the authority to 
control prohibitive discovery costs by requiring phased discovery at certain 
times or in a particular sequence.65  Parties can also seek protection from 
undue discovery burdens in the form of a protective order under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). These discretionary powers within the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a trial judge to prevent the type of 
ESI discovery that would truly cost more than the amount in controversy 
and may serve to maintain the viability of traditional privilege review. 
In addition, other measures may be used to preserve traditional privilege 
review methods.  Law firms may hire temporary contract attorneys to 
perform initial review of ESI at discounted rates.  Of course, litigants may 
always avoid excessive expenditures on pre-production privilege review 
through settlement.  To be sure, the costs of traditional privilege review 
may inflate the settlement value of a case to the producing party and one of 
 
 62. See New York Hearing, supra note 59, at 88 (testimony of Patrick Oot) (explaining 
that, for Verizon matters with privilege review costs in the millions, the amount at stake for 
the company is around $20 million). 
 63. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii); see also GENSLER, supra note 14, at 534 (discussing 
the importance of proportionality limits on the fair and efficient operation of the discovery 
rules). 
 65. See GENSLER, supra note 14, at 536 (“[T]he court can structure the order of 
discovery to ensure that the parties gather the ‘low-hanging fruit’ first, taking discovery from 
the most important or the most accessible sources before determining whether there is any 
need to cast the discovery net more widely.”).  Judge Grimm’s standard discovery order 
circulated to Symposium participants represents an excellent example of such proactive 
judicial discovery management that serves to minimize wasteful discovery and privilege 
review (on file with author). See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1572–73 (comments of 
the Honorable Paul Grimm) (discussing his standard case management order). 
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the goals of Rule 502 was to eliminate such e-discovery settlement 
leverage.66  While a settlement may ultimately cost the producing party 
more than technology-assisted review would have, lawyers who perceive 
significant unquantifiable risk associated with production of privileged 
materials may find a concrete settlement to be a superior alternative to 
producing materials without eyes-on review.  With these tools in their 
arsenal to avoid spending amounts on privilege review unjustified by the 
amount at stake in a particular case, litigants may perceive that traditional 
eyes-on privilege review remains viable. 
Third, even data showing $13.5 million spent on outside privilege review 
in a single piece of litigation may not generate the requisite dissatisfaction 
with the existing privilege review model to drive change. To be sure, such 
cases may create client dissatisfaction with the current method and cost of 
privilege review, depending on the overall value of the litigation, and 
systemic dysfunction due to potentially wasteful expenditures on privilege 
review.  Still, client economic waste and client dissatisfaction represent 
only one side of the coin.67  The other side of the coin represents the outside 
law firms that billed such a staggering amount for privilege review.  
Privilege review “sticker shock” may not necessarily lead to widespread 
attorney dissatisfaction with the traditional model, and it is largely attorney 
dissatisfaction that is necessary to drive a conceptual change in the 
traditional privilege review model.  The outside attorneys who represent 
clients engaged in massive e-discovery are typically the gatekeepers to the 
use of vehicles such as Rule 502(d) to truncate privilege review and cut 
costs.  In-house counsel at large institutional clients also drive such 
decisions to some extent, but often rely on the advice of outside counsel to 
make recommendations about overarching decisions like those involving a 
discovery plan.68  Utilizing Rule 502(d) to limit attorney privilege review in 
a case involving large-scale ESI production requires reliance on outside 
document review vendors to do the software search necessary to perform an 
electronic review.69  A dramatic paradigm shift to this form of privilege 
review alone involves outsourcing a staple component of law firm business 
to the technology industry.70 
At a time when the legal market has suffered considerably as a result of 
the downturn in the economy, swift adoption of a measure that further 
 
 66. See Buffmire, supra note 4, at 154. 
 67. Of course, the cost-benefit analysis of privilege review costs from the client’s 
perspective requires assessment of the value of the interests at stake in the instant litigation 
and any subsequent litigation on related matters. 
 68. While it appears that some organizational clients are becoming more involved in 
discovery planning, there remains a great deal of reliance on outside counsel in directing the 
“review” phase of the discovery process. PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at xiv (noting that 
review of ESI remains “largely the domain of outside counsel”). 
 69. Id. at xv, tbl. S.1 (demonstrating that outside vendors take primary responsibility for 
the collection and processing phases of e-discovery). 
 70. Id. at xvii–xviii (discussing significant cost savings achieved through replacement of 
eyes-on review of all ESI pre-production with a method relying heavily on “predictive 
coding” and eyes-on review of small samples). 
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minimizes the need for attorney billable hours in litigation may be a tough 
pill to swallow.71  Although attorneys will undoubtedly need to consult with 
document review vendors as a component of ESI review, they may be 
unwilling to outsource this function entirely through reliance on Rule 
502(d).72  Notwithstanding their professional role, lawyers are human 
beings and it may be unrealistic to expect them to serve as the spear-carriers 
for the Rule 502(d) revolution to their own financial detriment.  While most 
lawyers will not consciously pursue inefficient methods for selfish reasons, 
it is noteworthy that the Rule 502 “self-help” provisions ask attorneys to 
make the choice that may cut against self-interest for the overall benefit of 
clients and the system. 
Billable-hour incentives aside, lawyers may legitimately fear ethical 
sanctions or malpractice liability as a result of inadequate pre-production 
privilege review, further maintaining satisfaction with traditional 
methodology.73  While malpractice liability and ethical sanctions may be 
available for breaches in client confidentiality occasioned by shoddy 
privilege review practices, it is difficult to imagine such consequences for 
excessive privilege review expenditures.74  Indeed, some courts have 
deemed technology-assisted review procedures “unreasonable” in 
considering inadvertent production under Rule 502(b).75  Conversely, it 
seems implausible that a client could demonstrate certain harm from over-
review absent extreme circumstances involving smoking gun evidence of 
file churning.  In other words, the safe and traditional choice from a lawyer 
exposure standpoint is also the most lucrative one.76 
 
 71. Id. at 46 (“Recent economic woes, along with rising numbers of law school 
graduates, have indeed produced a glut of attorneys, many of whom have found themselves 
in a situation in which contracted review has become one of the few viable options for 
maintaining a steady income stream.”). 
 72. Id. at xix (noting that “[a]nother barrier to widespread use [of electronic review of 
ESI] could well be resistance to the idea from outside counsel, who would stand to lose a 
historical revenue stream.”). 
 73. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1555 (comments of Chilton Varner, Esq.) 
(“[T]here is an inbred reluctance to say that what would have been five years ago the gross 
negligence of not looking for privileged documents before they were produced is now a get-
out-of-jail-free card . . . .  and it’s especially hard when the client is a lawyer . . . brought up 
to believe that waiving a privilege was . . . maybe the worst thing you could do as a 
lawyer.”). 
 74. See Murphy, supra note 25, at 233 (discussing the ethical obligation to maintain 
client confidentiality under ABA Model Rule 1.6 and possible malpractice liability for 
disclosure of privileged documents). See generally Paula Schaefer, The Future of 
Inadvertent Disclosure:  The Lingering Need To Revise Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. 
L. REV. 195 (2010). 
 75. See Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 36–38 (discussing the Mt. Hawley case and 
noting that “[i]f courts find waiver in cases where parties use computer analytical tools 
properly, . . . lawyers and clients never will transition away from the burdensome and very 
expensive [privilege review] methods”). 
 76. See PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at xix (“Few lawyers would want to be placed 
in the uncomfortable position of having to argue that a predictive coding strategy reflects 
reasonable precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure, overproduction, or 
underproduction, especially when no one else seems to be using it.”). 
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Against this backdrop of incentives, it would be irrational for lawyers to 
flock to use Rule 502(d) to dispense with traditional privilege review.  
Indeed, the negligence standard is specifically set to require actors to take 
into account societal interests in establishing a standard of care, rather than 
purely selfish considerations.77  In order to achieve efficient levels of 
protection for all, liability attaches to the selfish choice if it fails to account 
for other values.  Companies are typically required to spend resources to 
ensure societally optimal safety.  The incentives for lawyers in connection 
with adoption of Rule 502(d) to minimize e-discovery costs are currently 
calibrated in the opposite direction.  The more they charge to conduct 
painstaking eyes-on privilege review for the protection of client 
confidentiality, the less likely they are to suffer ethical sanctions or 
malpractice liability.  Such concerns may be instrumental in maintaining 
lawyer satisfaction with traditional privilege review, notwithstanding 
mounting costs. 
In light of the foregoing realities, it appears that it will take client 
dissatisfaction with traditional privilege review methodology to drive 
conceptual change toward a Rule 502(d) model.  As the stakeholders with 
the most to gain from computer-assisted review of ESI, clients awarding 
business to lawyers based upon a sliding scale of cost and skill must push 
attorneys toward change.  Once clients become dissatisfied with traditional 
privilege review, law firms will be forced to compete for business through 
adoption of cheaper alternatives aided by the Rule 502 “self-help” 
provisions.  Indeed, pressure from clients to reduce discovery costs has 
already been brought to bear.  Recent downturns in the economy have led to 
client demands for lower rates and law firms have had to respond to avoid 
losing business.78  Such pressure has not necessarily led to abandonment of 
page-by-page privilege review, however.  Some firms have responded with 
efforts to bring cheaper review alternatives in-house, developing internal 
document review centers, employing IT professionals, as well as less 
expensive contract lawyers to provide large-scale ESI review at lower cost 
to clients.79  So long as clients remain satisfied with the costs associated 
with review methodologies like these, law firms are unlikely to pursue less-
costly alternatives. 
Additional education may be necessary to generate client dissatisfaction 
with existing privilege review techniques that remain significantly more 
expensive than the technology-assisted review made possible through Rule 
502.  Conferences and publications like this Symposium may be critical in 
 
 77. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) (“Where an act is one 
which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is 
unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the 
law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.”). 
 78. Changes in the economic climate for lawyers may drive this type of competition. See 
PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at 39 (noting that “recent economic conditions” have 
resulted in “significant changes in . . . financial relationships with outside counsel” and 
noting “[p]ressure” from clients to reduce costs). 
 79. Id. at 41–55. 
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educating institutional clients who can be expected to consume such 
materials.80  Including client representatives in scheduling conferences 
where they may gain exposure to cost-saving options and influence counsel 
to make a client-centered choice may also generate greater dissatisfaction 
with current privilege review methods.  While this may not be a viable 
option for cases involving individual clients, it is certainly workable in 
federal litigation involving organizational clients served by sophisticated in-
house counsel and executives.  It is in these cases involving organizational 
clients that the prospect of extensive e-discovery is most pronounced.81  To 
the extent that such increased client education causes some firms to begin 
competing for business by utilizing Rule 502(d) and touting reduced 
discovery costs, this change could drive the broader legal market to 
embrace such measures. 
Before lawyers will utilize technology-assisted privilege review to 
compete for and retain clients, however, reliable protection from ethical 
sanctions and malpractice liability must be in place.  This could involve 
alteration in ethical standards to account for disclosure without review.82  
Such changes to ethical standards and to prevailing privilege review 
practice could also serve to minimize malpractice exposure for disclosures 
without review.  In addition, guidelines governing the adoption of such 
methods could encourage lawyers to utilize technology-assisted review 
techniques.  Technology-assisted review guidelines could instruct lawyers 
to engage in a colloquy with a client regarding the costs and benefits of 
various ESI review options.  Much like physicians in the context of 
informed consent, lawyers should allow clients to select the review 
methodology most consistent with client goals in a given case.83  With 
express and informed client consent, attorneys would be largely insulated 
from ethical or malpractice exposure as a result of selected privilege review 
techniques. 
Finally, some potential for malpractice liability or ethical sanctions for 
needlessly spending on privilege review would drive lawyers toward greater 
use of Rule 502(d) methods.  In light of longstanding waiver law and 
 
 80. Id. at 36–37 (noting that “in e-discovery generally, the interests of in-house counsel 
and their external law firm colleagues may not always be in precise alignment, with the 
potential for billing opportunities for review resulting in the law firms . . . viewing the 
company’s litigation demands as lucrative ‘cash cows,’ with each new e-discovery demand 
seen as ‘a bird’s nest on the ground.’”); id. at 38 (noting that allowing outside counsel to 
handle vendor choices for collection of ESI is not the most “cost-effective” approach). 
 81. As was pointed out during the Symposium, many of the institutional “clients” are 
themselves lawyers who may share the traditional attorney concerns with truncated privilege 
review discussed above. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1554 (noting that the “client” is 
often a lawyer) (comments of Chilton Varner, Esq.). 
 82. See generally Murphy, supra note 25. 
 83. See Schaefer, supra note 74, at 247–49 (discussing proposed amendments to ethical 
rules requiring counsel to communicate with clients regarding privilege review protocol to 
be used to prevent disclosures). See generally Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 
186 (Minn. 1958) (describing a doctor’s duty to explain available alternatives to a patient to 
facilitate the patient’s choice and assessment of risk). 
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traditional privilege review methodology, it may be impossible currently to 
prevail in a malpractice case arguing that a lawyer excessively reviewed a 
production for privilege.  As clients drive the culture of privilege review 
toward technology-assisted review, the possibility of sanction for failure to 
offer such a cost-saving option could develop to further incentivize attorney 
reliance on Rule 502(d).  Much like a doctor who would be liable for failure 
to inform a patient of a viable healthcare alternative, lawyers could be held 
responsible for failing to alert clients to technology-assisted alternatives 
made possible by 502(d).  In sum, existing data, methods, and incentives 
may be inadequate to generate widespread dissatisfaction with the 
traditional method of page-by-page privilege review among the lawyers 
who largely drive the use of Rule 502(d).  This lack of attorney-based 
dissatisfaction with traditional privilege review may serve as a significant 
impediment to conceptual change.  Client education and demand appears 
most likely to drive attorney adoption of this option, alongside protections 
from ethical and malpractice exposure. 
C.  Does a Rule 502(d) Order Provide a “Viable” Alternative to 
Traditional Privilege Review? 
Attorneys who fail to recommend less expensive electronic privilege 
review through use of a Rule 502(d) order are likely not motivated purely 
by greed and fear.  The second critical component of radical conceptual 
change demands an “intelligible” and “plausible” alternative paradigm that 
can readily replace the traditional model that is no longer functioning 
optimally.84  In other words, lawyers must be able to grasp the operation of 
a 502(d) order and to appreciate its ability to resolve the existing problems 
of expensive privilege review.  Due to ambiguities created by the 
overlapping authority of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in this area, litigants may not have a firm grasp 
on the operation of the “self-help” provisions of Rule 502.  Further, to truly 
change the nature of traditional privilege review and reduce costs 
accordingly, attorneys and litigants must perceive documented success in 
utilizing Rule 502(d).  Where attorneys have yet to observe documented 
savings and success through the use of quick-peek and clawback 
arrangements, they may not perceive the viable alternative to traditional 
privilege review necessary to drive conceptual change. 
1.  Visibility of Evidence Rules 
First, lawyers and judges may remain unaware of the self-help features of 
Rule 502(d) and (e), notwithstanding their enactment over four years ago, 
because of their placement in the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Judges and 
lawyers engaged in discovery planning and practice at the federal level 
rightly consider the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the discovery “Bible.”  
 
 84. See Posner et al., supra note 10, at 214. 
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Indeed, Rule 502 was enacted as a supplement to the e-discovery 
amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to make the clawback 
arrangement outlined therein protected from findings of privilege waiver.85  
Because those amendments predated Rule 502, they could not contain a 
reference to the evidentiary provision.  Lawyers engaged in civil discovery 
rarely consult their evidence rules to determine their rights and obligations, 
and the same may be said of district and magistrate judges.  In sum, many 
lawyers, litigants, and judges may not be aware of the existence of the Rule 
502(d) and (e) alternatives.  This obstacle to conceptual change could be 
easily remedied through both rulemaking and education.  As has been 
suggested by commentators, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be 
amended to add a specific reference to Rule 502.86  This amendment would 
create prominent visibility in the resource most likely to be consulted in the 
discovery process, and it seems advisable in order to make the interaction 
between discovery procedures and evidentiary protections clear and 
accessible. 
There are several possibilities for the placement of a Rule 502 reference 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rule 26(f)(3)(D) governing 
discovery plans could be amended to specifically direct the parties to 
address a potential 502(e) agreement regarding privilege review and waiver, 
as well as their desire for a Rule 502(d) order in their discovery plan.  This 
would direct lawyers unaware of the protection afforded by Rule 502 to 
their Evidence Rules to investigate.  Amendment of Rule 16(b)(3)(B) to 
include a Rule 502(d) order as a feature that judges “may” incorporate into 
a scheduling order also seems advisable.87  Although the current version of 
Rule 16 directs courts to consider including party “agreements” with 
respect to the assertion of privilege, it does not expressly contemplate a sua 
sponte or contested order covering the same issues.  Focusing the trial judge 
on the possibility of a court-driven measure also seems likely to increase 
use of Rule 502(d) orders.  There could obviously be an educational 
component to overcoming any 502 information-gap as well.  Educating 
district and magistrate judges about the benefits of Rule 502(d) and (e) for 
effective case management could encourage judges to utilize them sua 
sponte or to push parties to consider such arrangements supported by a 
court order. 
 
 85. See GENSLER, supra note 14, at 531 (describing the origins of Rule 502 as part of e-
discovery amendments to the FRCP). 
 86. See, e.g., Buffmire, supra note 4, at 146 (proposing amendment to FRCP 26(f)).  
Importantly, the FRCP already references Evidence Rules when there is a relevant 
interaction, which may create an expectation that the FRCP will point to the FRE where 
pertinent. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A) (citing Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, 
and 705). 
 87. See Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 73 (noting that a federal judge may include a 
clawback provision in a Rule 16 scheduling order). 
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2.  Rule 502(d) Standard 
Second, even if litigants are aware that the “self-help” provisions in Rule 
502(d) and (e) exist, they may be uncertain as to how they fit into the 
detailed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure framework governing discovery 
and as to the standards applicable to invoke them.  Again, this potential 
obstacle to the use of Rule 502 stems from the interaction between the Civil 
Procedure Rules and the Evidence Rules.  For the “self-help” provisions of 
Rule 502 to protect parties from waiver in other litigation, the court must 
enter an order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d).88  Litigants and 
judges engaged in discovery planning are accustomed to utilizing court 
orders to deal with discovery issues under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and may be unclear as to where in that framework the Rule 
502(d) order fits.  In that context, courts enter scheduling orders under Rule 
16(b).  Under Rule 16(b)(3)(B), judges may include in such scheduling 
orders “any agreements the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or 
of protection as trial-preparation material after information is produced.”89  
Due to the explicit reference to privilege issues, a Rule 16 order may seem 
the best vehicle for creating Rule 502(d) protection.  Even assuming Rule 
16 represents the proper vehicle, the standard applicable to a court’s 
decision to grant such protection in any given case remains unclear.  On one 
hand, the language of Rule 16(b)(3)(B) may suggest that trial judges should 
include a Rule 502(e) agreement in a scheduling order automatically 
without any additional findings by the trial judge or showing by the parties.  
On the other hand, Rule 16(b) specifically provides that trial judges “may” 
include such items in the scheduling order and that they are “permissive” 
rather than “required.”90  This may suggest that the trial judge retains 
discretion to enter a Rule 502(d) order as part of a scheduling order, but 
Rule 502(d) fails to provide a clear standard for exercising that discretion.91  
Furthermore, Rule 16(b) specifically describes only situations in which the 
parties reach an “agreement” as to privilege protection and waiver.92  The 
Advisory Committee notes to Rule 502(d) make clear that courts have the 
power to enter an order protecting the parties from waiver even in the 
 
 88. FED. R. EVID. 502(d). 
 89. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iv). 
 90. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(A) (stipulating items that “must” be included in a 
scheduling order), with FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B) (outlining the contents of a scheduling 
order that are merely “permitted”). 
 91. Even assuming a liberal standard for an initial decision to include a nonwaiver 
agreement as part of a scheduling order, modification of a scheduling order to add a 
nonwaiver order requires “good cause.” See Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 60 (noting that a 
court may modify a scheduling order to limit waiver for “good cause” pursuant to FRCP 
16(b)(4)). 
 92. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3) (requiring parties to develop a discovery plan and to “state 
the parties’ views and proposals on . . . any issues about claims of privilege or of protection 
as trial preparation materials, including—if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these 
claims after production—whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order.”).  
It is at this Rule 26(f) conference and during the development of a discovery plan that parties 
must explore the possibility of a Rule 502(e) agreement. 
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absence of party agreement, but are silent as to the standard a trial judge 
should use in deciding to enter such an order without party consent.93 
On the other hand, the commentary to Rule 502 discusses entry of a 
“confidentiality order,” which may seem to point to entry of a “protective 
order” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).94  Indeed, one of the 
aims of this Symposium was to create a model “protective order” to guide 
litigants seeking to utilize Rule 502(d).95  Protective orders are designed to 
protect a party from “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 
burden or expense.”96  A 502(d) order is most certainly directed at 
protecting a party from “undue burden” and “expense.”97  The Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure require “good cause” to support entry of a 
protective order, however, and the party seeking such an order bears the 
burden of demonstrating such “good cause.”98  Courts and litigants may 
legitimately expect that a “good cause” standard applies to entry of a 
contested or sua sponte order under Rule 502(d) and that such protection 
will not be freely given absent the requisite showing. 
In Rajala v. McGuire Woods,99 the court utilized a “good cause” standard 
pursuant to Rule 26(c) in granting an opposed request for a Rule 502(d) 
order.100  In that case, the defendant law firm successfully argued that an 
order protecting against waiver was “necessary” due to extensive ESI 
production and the high volume of client confidences contained in firm 
records.101   Where Rule 502(d) is silent with respect to a controlling 
standard, judges and litigants may legitimately expect that a Rule 502(d) 
order should only be granted upon a showing of “good cause.”  Although 
some commentators have suggested the use of a Rule 502(d) order as a 
standard best practice in every federal case, judges and litigants may 
hesitate to utilize Rule 502(d) absent some compelling and demonstrable 
case-specific need.102 
 
 93. FED. R. EVID. 502(d) (“A federal court may order that the privilege or protection is 
not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court—in which 
event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding.”); see also 
id. advisory committee’s note (“Party agreement should not be a condition of enforceability 
of a federal court’s order.”). 
 94. Id. advisory committee’s note (describing a 502(d) order as a “confidentiality 
order”). 
 95. See generally Model Draft of a Rule 502(d) Order, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587 
(2013); see also Grimm et al., supra note 21, at 69 (Rule 502 encourages courts “to approve 
such agreements by issuing a protective order if requested to do so, or on their own 
volition.”). 
 96. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
 97. See FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (identifying one purpose being to 
prevent wasteful privilege review costs). 
 98. See GENSLER, supra note 14, at 559–60 (noting that “[a] party seeking a protective 
order may not rely on vague or speculative claims of such harm but instead must give 
specific reasons and facts supporting the protective order.”). 
 99. No. 08-2638-CM-DJW, 2010 WL 2949582 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010). 
 100. Id. at *6. 
 101. Id. at *2. 
 102. See Buffmire, supra note 4, at 172 (suggesting the routine use of Rule 502(d) 
orders). 
 1688 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Conversely, litigants that have an agreement or a protective order in place 
that addresses inadvertent disclosure and waiver may expect that they are 
protected under Rule 502 even absent express reference to the evidentiary 
rule.  Judicial refusal to uphold waiver protection under such circumstances 
undermines the viability of the Rule 502(d) order as an alternative to 
traditional privilege review.  Litigants, uncertain as to the magic words 
necessary to invoke meaningful 502(d) protection, may reject it as a reliable 
solution to costly pre-production privilege review.103  In sum, the necessity 
of having waiver protection embodied in the Evidence Rules separate and 
apart from the discovery framework outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure may create uncertainties regarding the procedures, standards, and 
terminology necessary to invoke the protection.  Such uncertainties may 
undermine the perceived viability of limited privilege review as an 
alternative to traditional lawyer review.  Without a viable alternative that 
lawyers can readily grasp and access, conceptual change theory suggests 
that they will cling to their central commitment to traditional privilege 
review practices. 
This barrier to conceptual change can be remedied through amendments 
to either or both the Civil Procedure Rules and the Evidence Rules.  Due to 
the need for congressional alteration of Rule 502, an amendment to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seems more plausible.104  If the intent of 
Rule 502(d) is to vest the trial judge with broad authority to enter a 
nonwaiver order in any case where she deems it appropriate without “good 
cause” or other particularized findings—whether it is agreed upon, opposed, 
or ignored by the parties, an amendment to Rule 16(b)(3)(B) appears most 
appropriate.  The amendment could allow trial judges to “include an order 
pursuant to Rule 502(d) protecting the parties from a finding of waiver of 
privilege or work product protection, irrespective of the care taken in pre-
production review.” 
Where Rule 16(b)(3)(B) confers upon trial judges “clear authority to 
enter comprehensive scheduling orders addressing the timing and conduct 
of virtually any aspect of the pretrial phase of the case,”105 placement of an 
express reference to Rule 502(d) in that provision of the Civil Rules should 
 
 103. See, e.g., Cmty. Bank v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 1:08-cv-01443-WTL-JMS, 
2010 WL 1435368, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 8, 2010) (rejecting counsel agreement documented 
in correspondence concerning the return of inadvertently produced documents as 
insufficiently formal to bind the parties); Luna Gaming-San Diego, L.L.C. v. Dorsey & 
Whitney L.L.P., No. 06cv2804 BTM (WMc), 2010 WL 275083, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 
2010) (finding a waiver of privilege through inadvertent disclosure notwithstanding a 
protective order providing that such disclosures “shall not constitute a waiver of any 
privilege”); Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., No. CV06-607-HU, 2008 WL 5122828, at 
*3–4 (D. Or. Dec. 4, 2008) (ignoring a protective order in finding waiver of privilege). 
 104. Whether an amendment to clarify the standard for entering a nonwaiver order 
constitutes a “privilege” amendment that must go through Congress is beyond the scope of 
this Essay.  It appears likely, however, that the original authority granted in 502(d) may be a 
sufficient congressional blessing and that a clarification of the standard remains well within 
the purview of the FRCP. 
 105. GENSLER, supra note 14, at 328. 
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signal to courts and litigants when to consider a Rule 502(d) order, as well 
as the broad discretionary standard applicable to its entry.  To the extent 
that there could be continuing uncertainty, committee notes to the 
amendment could expressly clarify that such an order is purely at the 
discretion of the court and requires no particularized showing from the 
litigants.  Further, reference to a “Rule 502(d) order” in Rule 16 could lead 
judges to make express reference to the evidentiary protection in styling 
scheduling orders, thus eliminating ambiguity with respect to the applicable 
authority for the waiver protection. 
Conversely, to the extent that the intent of Rule 502(d) is to treat such an 
order like a protective order given its purpose to protect from undue burden 
and expense, an alternative amendment could be made to Rule 26(c).  Such 
an amendment could clarify that courts should enter Rule 502(d) orders 
pursuant to the authority granted to them therein and using the well-
recognized “good cause” standard to choose the cases in which to allow 
them.  Regardless of the standard adopted, courts and litigants would 
receive clearer direction as to how the Rule 502(d) order fits into the 
complex discovery framework of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3.  The Rule 502(d) Endgame 
Another obstacle to the perceived viability of reduced privilege review 
may be concern about the “endgame” with a 502(d) order in place.  At some 
point in the pretrial phase, parties need certainty that they may utilize the 
materials produced by an adversary in preparing a case for trial.  To be 
certain, many ESI-heavy cases may be “settlement” cases, but even to 
negotiate a settlement, litigants need to have a handle on the evidence 
available to pursue a claim or defense.  If produced materials may be 
“clawed back” at any time, both sides may legitimately feel hampered in 
their trial preparation by uncertainty as to which produced materials will 
ultimately be “off-limits.”  Such uncertainty may undermine the perceived 
viability of a 502(d) order. 
In Luna Gaming-San Diego L.L.C. v. Dorsey & Whitney, L.L.P.,106 the 
parties entered into a protective order, approved by a magistrate judge, 
providing for nonwaiver as a result of disclosure and allowing the parties to 
clawback any inadvertently produced privileged documents.107  The agreed-
upon order did not specify the procedures to be utilized in exercising the 
right to clawback privileged documents, however.  Following disclosure, 
plaintiff failed to object to defendant’s use of privileged materials during 
one deposition and failed to follow up and demand return of privileged 
materials after objecting to their use in a later deposition.108  Ultimately, 
plaintiff failed to timely object to defendant’s use of privileged materials in 
 
 106. No. 06cv2804 BTM (WMc), 2010 WL 275083 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010). 
 107. Id. at *1. 
 108. Id. 
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support of summary judgment motions.109  When plaintiff later objected to 
the use of these materials, the district court found that plaintiff had waived 
privilege—not by disclosing the materials—but by failing to object 
promptly to their use by the other side.110  Although the court in Luna 
Gaming arguably ignored the parties’ ability to trump the default rule found 
in 502(b) by requiring prompt remedial action to reclaim privileged 
material, its holding reflects the real concern that ill-defined agreements and 
court orders may produce inefficiency and uncertainty that may impede the 
resolution of disputes. 
This potential barrier to the viability of 502(d) orders may best be 
remedied through individual orders tailored to the needs of a particular case.  
Committee notes to the above-proposed amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure could encourage judges to include deadlines and 
procedures for “clawbacks” and “quick peeks” that require reasonably 
prompt notification of a privilege or work product claim once the producing 
party has “reason to know” of its disclosure of protected information.  Such 
a “reason-to-know” standard would not require a producing party to engage 
in costly continuing review of its production.  The standard would require 
notification of privilege if the producing party independently discovers its 
own privileged production or when the requesting party attempts to utilize a 
previously produced privileged document during the pretrial phase.  If the 
requesting party attaches a produced document to a deposition, that party 
should have some assurance that it will not be “clawed back” months later.  
It would also be important to set an ultimate deadline for “clawbacks” and 
“quick peeks,” either by agreement or otherwise.  While a “reason-to-
know” standard could generate some discovery disputes in and of itself, 
providing some limit to prevent strategic misuse of the clawback 
arrangement could ultimately foster greater acceptance of Rule 502(e) 
agreements and 502(d) orders.  Further, publication of model 502(d) orders, 
such as the one produced by this Symposium, may serve as important 
guidance to litigants and judges seeking to utilize this method to manage 
discovery. 
4.  The Document Dump 
Some cases reflect concern that a Rule 502(d) order will not reduce e-
discovery costs, but will simply shift the burdens of ESI review from the 
producing party to the requesting party.111  Without the specter of privilege 
 
 109. Id. at *4. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Rajala v. McGuire Woods, No. 08-2638, 2010 WL 2949582-CM-DJW, at 
*7 (D. Kan. July 22, 2010) (the plaintiff opposed a 502(d) order for this reason).  The 
foregoing impediments to the viability of Rule 502(d) are somewhat party neutral.  In other 
words, whether your client is the producing or requesting party, visibility and functionality 
may be a concern.  Some perceived impediments to the viability of quick-peek or clawback 
arrangements are more party-specific and may be experienced depending on whether the 
party is the producing or requesting party. 
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waiver to motivate careful review, the producing parties in large-scale ESI 
cases may dump voluminous materials of limited relevance on requesting 
parties.  This could be done strategically to create settlement leverage or 
simply as a cost-saving measure.  Such concerns are most likely to arise in 
cases involving individual litigants with little ESI to produce suing 
organizational actors with significant amounts of potentially relevant ESI.  
This perceived cost-shifting potential for a 502(d) order may act as an 
additional barrier to conceptual change.112 
Concerns about ESI dumping should not operate as an obstacle to greater 
use of Rule 502(d) orders, however.  First, party agreement is unnecessary 
and a trial judge may institute 502(d) protection over a requesting party’s 
objection.113  Should a requesting party voice legitimate concerns about ESI 
dumping, the trial judge can utilize phased discovery to require targeted and 
sequential productions that are manageable.114  Further, judges have 
inherent and enumerated sanctioning power to prevent and punish genuine 
abuse.115  To the extent that requesting parties fear excessive production of 
materials under a 502(d) order, such fear could drive greater care in crafting 
proportional discovery requests.  If the presence of a 502(d) order leads to 
more targeted discovery requests, this represents an added benefit of such 
orders and promises to further reduce discovery costs by narrowing the field 
of responsive ESI requiring review in the first place.  Indeed, there has been 
some discussion in the ESI era of adding greater proportionality limits on 
the scope of discovery and explicit cost-shifting to curb tendencies to seek 
broad, expansive discovery requiring search, review, and production of 
voluminous ESI.116  Rule 502(d) may naturally create similar incentives for 
the requesting party without express cost-shifting or proportionality limits.  
If appropriately managed by the trial judge, therefore, the specter of 
document dumping on the requesting party should not serve as a legitimate 
obstacle to 502(d) orders. 
 
 112. See Jessica Wang, Nonwaiver Agreements After Federal Rule of Evidence 502:  A 
Glance at Quick-Peek and Clawback Agreements, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1835, 1848 (2009) 
(noting concern that nonwaiver agreements “could potentially offload the cost to the other 
party because the receiving party must spend its time reviewing the produced documents.”). 
 113. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 115. See GENSLER, supra note 14, at 576 (discussing the increasing judicial use of FRCP 
26(g) sanctioning power to encourage litigants to “stop and think” about responsible 
discovery practices); id. at 579 (discussing the judicial sanctioning power under FRCP 37 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, as well as “inherent powers”). 
 116. See Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules 
of Civil Procedure, to Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & 
Procedure 9 (Dec. 2, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Reports/CV12-2011.pdf (noting that “[s]ome advantage might be found in 
adding a proportionality limit to the broad scope provisions in Rule 26(b)(1) . . . .  It also 
might help to add explicit cost-shifting provisions . . .”). 
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5.  Fruit of the Poisonous 502 Tree 
Another obstacle to the use of 502(d) to reduce privilege review costs is 
concern that protection from waiver is inadequate to protect a client from 
other negative consequences of sharing privileged information with an 
adversary.  A producing party utilizing technology-assisted privilege review 
may be concerned that an opponent may glean helpful information or a 
valuable strategic advantage simply from viewing privileged information 
produced under a 502(d) order.117  Even if an opponent is barred from using 
that privileged information, he may pursue other avenues of investigation 
and argument revealed by the privileged documents that otherwise would 
have remained unexplored. Without conducting an eyes-on privilege 
review, producing parties fear that the risk associated with this possibility 
will be unquantifiable until the litigation is resolved.  Negative downstream 
consequences may even flow to related litigation if an adversary develops a 
viable strategy originating from privileged disclosures, but utilizing 
nonprivileged information.  As it stands, there is no clear derivative use 
protection inherent in Rule 502 that could minimize such concerns.118  This 
threat of derivative use of privileged information further impedes the 
adoption of cost-effective electronic ESI review and the acceptance of the 
Rule 502 self-help provisions by disclosing parties.119 
There are two potential avenues to eliminating this obstacle to fuller use 
of Rule 502(d).  First, judges and litigants could attempt to craft derivative 
use protection in individual 502(d) orders to prevent any strategic benefit to 
a requesting party arising out of privileged disclosures.120  As discussed 
during this Symposium, this protection could be akin to the “use immunity” 
afforded criminal defendants in the context of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.121  While the government bears a 
 
 117. See Buffmire, supra note 4, at 153 (noting the concern that a “litigant might be 
harmed by an opposing party merely reading the information contained in a privileged 
document.”); Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1554 (comments of Chilton Varner, Esq.) 
(noting that “possession of that [privileged] information by the adversary or by third parties 
can generate additional discovery that would not have been done, additional claims that may 
not have been made, additional problems that have to be resolved.”). 
 118. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1566 (comments of Professor Daniel J. Capra, 
Moderator) (noting that “under the common law, it’s not absolutely clear that a recipient is 
barred from using the fruits of privileged information.”). 
 119. Relatedly, a producing party may perceive that technology-assisted review merely 
delays the cost of attorney review of a production, rather than truly eliminating that cost.  
Because lawyers must review responsive documents at some point in the course of litigation 
to develop strategies and arguments, some litigants may perceive inadequate cost savings to 
justify risks of damaging disclosures to an adversary.  Front-loading lawyer review for 
privilege and strategy may seem preferable to producing without review only to conduct 
such review later in the litigation. See id. at 1554–55 (comments of Chilton Varner, Esq.). 
 120. See id. at 1567 (comments of Professor Daniel J. Capra, Moderator) (noting the 
possibility of “prohibiting use of fruits in a 502(d) order”). 
 121. See United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441, 448–49 (1972) (preventing the 
government from using information directly or indirectly derived from immunized 
testimony); United States v. Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that a 
“‘common understanding’ of the term ‘use immunity’ has arisen ‘in the criminal justice 
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“heavy burden” in the criminal context to prove that it has not used tainted 
evidence to build its case, the recipient of privileged disclosures in a civil 
context in which Rule 502(d) orders are most likely to be employed could 
be required to make some lesser showing of independent development of 
litigation strategies.122 
This option appears unlikely to produce the certain protection necessary 
to convert litigants to the use of technology-assisted privilege review and 
threatens the efficiency objective of Rule 502, however.  Constructing 
meaningful protection for the producing party that preserves requesting 
party opportunities to explore litigation strategies would be a drafting 
challenge to say the least.  Further, because of the difficulty in identifying 
the source of litigation strategies with precision, derivative use protection 
would certainly lead to contentious pretrial disputes.  Added litigation over 
the issue of derivative use creates costs and inefficiencies that run counter 
to the goals of Rule 502(d) to streamline the discovery process through 
greater party cooperation.  Even more troubling, the incorporation of 
derivative use protection into Rule 502(d) orders could facilitate the use of 
privilege “as a sword” rather than “a shield.”  Derivative use protection 
would arm the disclosing party with a new argument to defeat trial 
strategies of its adversary.  As noted during discussion at the Symposium, 
derivative use protection could lead to party abuse, with litigants 
“inadvertently” revealing privileged information by design to invoke such 
protection as a litigation tactic.  Such aggressive use of privilege is at odds 
with traditional privilege doctrine, as well as the goals of cooperation and 
efficiency embodied in Rule 502.  The potential prejudice to a requesting 
party’s litigation position could further discourage party agreement to 
clawback and quick-peek arrangements and increase the likelihood of 
opposed motions for Rule 502(d) orders.  In sum, constructing meaningful 
and fair use protection to prevent adversarial benefit from privileged 
disclosures appears somewhat unrealistic and fraught with peril. 
The more promising alternative involves generating additional data to 
minimize fear of privileged revelations arising out of technology-assisted 
review.  Lawyers maintain traditional review methodology because they 
assume that human review produces more accurate results and reduces the 
risk of unintended and damaging revelations to an adversary.  This 
perceived risk to the producing party will continue to impede conceptual 
change in the area of privilege review absent evidence to the contrary.123  
Reliable data regarding the accuracy of technology-assisted privilege 
review could satisfy the second critical step in the conceptual change 
 
world’ expanding the term to encompass derivative use immunity.”) (citing United States. v. 
Plummer, 941 F.2d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 122. Although Rule 502 has application in the criminal context, the ability to use a 502(d) 
order to minimize discovery costs is most salient in the civil context. 
 123. PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at xviii (“Because this is nascent technology, there 
is little research on how the accuracy of predictive coding compares with that of human 
review.”). 
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process by demonstrating a viable alternative to the existing privilege 
review paradigm. 
The studies that have compared human document review to electronic 
review suggest that the “gold standard” of attorney review is a “myth.”124  
To dismantle this myth once and for all and remove this obstacle to the 
adoption of electronic review techniques, lawyers and clients need reliable 
information regarding the actual risk of privileged revelations with the use 
of computerized review methods.  Although some studies have been 
performed to pit the computer against the human reviewer, many of these 
comparisons have involved review for responsiveness rather than privilege.  
Importantly, however, these studies suggest that the accuracy of electronic 
review promises to be superior, rather than inferior, to traditional eyes-on 
review.  If well-executed and highly publicized studies can be performed to 
compare technology-assisted privilege review to lawyer privilege review, 
they may similarly reveal fewer inadvertently disclosed privileged materials 
in connection with electronic review.125  Research and education of this 
kind will eventually lead to abandonment of the myth of the gold standard 
of eyes-on privilege review.  Once this is achieved, the specter of derivative 
use of inadvertently produced privileged materials will no longer plague the 
cost-effective technology-assisted review that Rule 502 aims to facilitate.  
Therefore, the more direct and efficient answer to disclosing party concerns 
regarding potential collateral use of disclosed privileged information 
appears to be research and education regarding the actual error rate inherent 
in electronic privilege review methodology.  Should highly publicized 
studies reveal the superiority of computerized privilege review, they would 
generate dissatisfaction with the traditional model and unveil the existence 
of a superior alternative to drive a full conceptual change with respect to e-
discovery.126 
CONCLUSION 
To a large degree, lawyer resistance to minimizing privilege review 
through the use of Rule 502 is simply a small piece of the larger struggle 
toward greater cooperation in the discovery process.  As one commentator 
has noted: 
At each stage, . . . the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] encourage—if 
not require—cooperation and responsible behavior . . . .  Despite these 
 
 124. Id. at xvii (noting studies documenting high rates of “human error” in page-by-page 
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clear signals about how lawyers should behave in discovery, complaints 
about lack of cooperation, incivility, over-discovery, and obstructionism 
are as common today as they were twenty-five years ago, perhaps even 
more so.127 
Litigators are zealous advocates.  Indeed, some trial lawyers are sought 
out due to their reputation for “scorched earth” litigation that treats an 
opponent as the enemy and eschews all cooperation as a conscious strategy.  
Although the discovery system requires greater collaboration and 
cooperation to function efficiently, it is a component of an essentially 
adversarial process.  No amount of exhortation to get along is likely to 
achieve genuine change in the relationship between opposing counsel.  
Sanctions, on the other hand, may.  Controlling counsels’ worst combative 
tendencies through conferences, scheduling orders, and protective orders 
will also minimize obstructionist behavior. 
Time-honored, lucrative, and safe methods of eyes-on privilege review 
present similar obstacles to change.  Lawyers are unlikely to respond to 
sermons about minimizing privilege review costs.  To drive true conceptual 
change and correspondingly drive down wasteful privilege review costs, 
litigants will require concrete data, methods, and incentives to facilitate 
movement in this direction.  The ideas generated by this Symposium hold 
great promise to remove existing obstacles to conceptual change.  With 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to bring visibility and 
functionality to Rule 502, education in the form of draft 502(d) orders, and 
the continuation of important research to quantify the degree of risk 
involved in computerized review, litigants may be on their way to reduced 
privilege review expenditures through Rule 502. 
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